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AN important decision made by each commercial
bank is whether to he a member of the Federal Re-
serve System (FRS). National banks are required by
law to be members but can withdraw from member-
ship with little difficulty by obtaining state charters.
State banks may choose whether to be members with-
out affecting the status of their state charters.
In recent years many banks have withdrawn from
the FRS, and the primary reason given is that they
must hold a larger share of their assets in non-earning
form as members than if they were nonmembers.1 The
FRS has proposed to reduce member bank reservere-
quirements as a means of making membership more
attractive. State bank regulators, however, might wish
to counter this action in order to keep the number of
banks under their supervision from declining, and
might seek to do so by lowering reserve requirements
for nonmember banks. For states to offset the effects
of a reduction in FRS reserve requirements on the
attractiveness of membership, state reserve require-
ments would have to be effective, in the sense of in-
fluencing the cash holdings of nonmember banks or
other aspects of nonmember bank behavior. Thus,
effectiveness of state reserve requirements is one of
the issues to consider in estimating the attractiveness
of proposals for reducing member hank reserve
requirements.
Effectiveness of state rcserve requirements is ana-
lyzed from three approaches. The first approach ex-
amines how close nonmember banks keep their cash
reserves to required cash reserves. A second approach
examines the influence of state reserve requirements
on the way nonmemher banks report their uncollected
funds. Most states do not count cash items in the
process of collection (CIPC) as cash resel-vcs; how-
ever, nonmember banks in such states can use uncol-
lected funds to meet reserve requirements by reporting
them as demand balances due from correspondents,
instead of as CIPC. This second approach tests
whether nonmember banks in states which do not
1
Peter Rose, “Exodus: Why Banks are Leaving the Fed,” The
Bankers Magazine (Winter 1976), pp. 43-49.
count CIPC as cash reserves report more of their un-
collected funds as demand balances due from corre-
spondents than nonmember banks in other states. A
third approach tests the effects of state reserve re-
quirements on the percentages of banks which are
FRS members in various states. Details of state re-
serve requirements are reported in a previous issue of
this Review.2
FIRST APPROACH
Nature of Data Available and
Appropriate Comvari,s’on,s’
Most state banking authorities compare average
cash assets to required cash reserves over one-week or
two-week periods to detennine whether banks are
meeting their reserve requirements. However, data
are available in a common format across states only as
2
R. Alton Cilbert and Jean M. Lovati, “Bank Reserve Require-
ments and Their Enforcement: A Comparison Across States,”
thi
5
Review (March 1978) pp. 22-32. Another approach that
has been used to test the eltectiveness of state reserve require-
ments is to estimate the relation between cash assets held by
nonmember banks and required cash reserves. See Lawrence
C. Coldberg and John T. Rose, “Do State Reserve Require-
ments Matter?” Journal of Bank Research (Spring 1977), pp.
31-39. That approach is not used in this paper for the follow-
ing reasons. If state reserve requirements influence cash
holdings of nonmember banks, demand for correspondent
balances by nonmember banks would also be a function of
additional variables, which should be held constant in testing
the influence of state reserve requirements on cash holdings
of nonmember banks. Data on some other determinants of
demand for correspondent balances, such as daily variability
of deposit liabilities, are not available for nonmember banks.
For evidence on the significance of deposit variability for
demand for correspondent deposits, see William C. Dewald
and C. Richard Dreese, “Bank Behavior with Respect to
Deposit Variability,” Journal of Finance (September 1970),
pp. 869-79. Another reason concerns the interpretation if a
positive relation is found between cash holdings and required
cash reserves of nonmember banks, Such a relation might
indicate that banks which hold relatively large percentages
of their assets in cash do so because of relatively high reserve
requirements. On the other hand, such a relation might indi-
cate that state banking authorities keep reserve requirements
relatively high in states in which nonmember banks hold
relatively high percentages of their assets in cash voluntarily.
In such states there would he little pressure on banking au-
thorities from banks to lower reserve requirements. In other
states in which banks wish to hold lower cash ratios, banking
authorities would be under pressure to keep reserve require-
ments no higher than voluntary cash holdings,
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of individual days. One source is the quarterly Report
of Condition for all Federally insured banks; the other
is balance sheets as of each Wednesday for nonmem-
her weekly reporting banks. Since these observations
are for individual days, at quarterly or weekly inter-
vals, observed cash holdings may he less than the
required amounts without necessarily indicating that
banks are violating state reserve requirements. Al-
ternately, reserves could be above required levels as
of individual days without necessarily indicating that
nonmember banks voluntarily hold more reserves than
required.
Another complication in drawing conclusions from
ratios of reserves to required reserves for effectiveness
of state reserve requirements is that banks often
choose to hold excess reserves. Relatively small
member banks hold substantial amounts of excess re-
serves, although most of them would tend to hold less
cash if their reserve requirements were reduced.3
These problems of interpretation are dealt with by
comparing the ratio of cash reserves to required cash
reserves for nonmember banks with the ratio of re-
serves to required reserves for member banks of com-
parable size, calculated for the same individual days.
The nonmember ratios are calculated using state re-
quirements, and member hank ratios using FRS re-
quirements. Member bank reserve requirements are
used here as a standard for effective reserve require-
ments. To indicatehow this standard is applied, sup-
pose noninemnber banks have ratios of cash reserves
to required cash reserves which are significantly higher
than such ratios for member banks of comparable size.
State reserve requirements would be considered not
effective, in the sense that cash holdings of nonmemn-
ber banks apparently would not be determined by
state reserve requirements to the same extent that
reserves of member banks are detennined by their
required reserves.
.Enipirical Results
One recent quarterly Report of Condition is used to
calculate ratios of cash reserves to required cash re-
serves for member and nonmember banks of compa-
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rable size, These calculations indicate that nonmember
banks in most statcs bold cash reserves which are sub-
stantially larger than their required cash reserves.
Cash reserves several times as large as required cash
reserves were most common among the smallest non-
member banks, with larger banks having smaller ratios.
In all but two of the 38 states for which such con3pari-
sons are made, the average ratios of cash reserves to
required cash reserves were significantlij higher than
those ratios for member banks of comparable size.
Thus, based upon this information, state reserve re-
quirements appear to be less effective than FRS
reserve requirements.4 Details of calculations and sta-
tistical tests are presented in section Io fthe Appendix.
In 1976 there were 23 weekly reporting banks
which were nonmembers. Two of those banks were
located in states with no cash reserve requirements.
Of the remaining 21 banks, 12 had average ratios of
cash reserves to required cash reserves which were not
significantly different from such ratios for member
banks of comparable size.°These 12 banks are located
in seven states. Thus, results for nonmember weeklyre-
porting banks provide evidence of effective state re-
serve requirements for some of the relatively large
nonmember banks in several states.
There are only a few nonmember banks that are
as large as weekly reporting banks. Evidence from
this approach indicates that state reserve require-
ments are not effective for most nonmember banks
in all hut a fe\v states, since their cash holdings are
so much larger than their required cash reserves.
SECOND APPROACH
All but seven states have reserve requirements
which must be satisfied completely, or in part, with
cash reserves, which include vault cash and demand
deposits with other domestic commercial banks.
Among the 43 states with reserve requirements which
must be met with cash assets, 17 allow banks to count
at least some types of cash items in the process of
collection (CIPC) as cash reserves. CIPC represent
primarily the dollar value of checks deposited with
correspondent banks for which the correspondents
have not received payment.
4
Note that this result does not imply a comparison of the
burden of reserve requirements of FRS members to the bur-
den of state rescrve requirements for nonmembers. The issue
being considcred is how close member and nonmnember banks
keep their cash reserves to their respective required cash
reserves.
~Each of the nonmember weekly reporting banks in 1976 had
total deposits greater than $180 million.
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There tend to be economies of scale in managing a bank’s
reserve position. For instance, Treasury bills have minimum
dollar denominations, and correspondent banks generally
have minimum dollar units in which they invest excess re-
serves of respondent banks in the Federal funds market. Also,
there are efficiencies due to speeialixation, since the persons
who manage the reserve positions of relatively small banks
generally have additional responsibilities. Excess reserve ratios
of relatively small member banks indicate that the transactions
and cash management costs which are necessary to reduce
excess reserves are larger than the potential increases in
income from investing them.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS SEPTEMBER 1978
Differences among states in treatment of CIPC as
reserves could have significant implications for the
effective levels of state reserve requirements if non-
member banks reported all of their uncollected funds
as CIPC, because uncollected funds constitute sub-
stantial proportions of required reserves for most
banks.” However, many banks report part or all of
their uncollected funds as demand balances due from
correspondents. Some banks may follow such an ac-
counting practice to use uncollected funds for meeting
reserve requirements. To illustrate why a bank might
do this, consider a nonmember bank which desires to
hold an amount of vault cash plus collected demand
balances with correspondents which is less than its
required cash reserves. If this bank is in a state which
does not count CIPC as reserves, it could increase its
reserves for purposes of meeting state requirements
by classifying its uncollected deposits at correspond-
ents as demand balances due from banks, rather than
as CIPC.
Regression analysis is used to test the influence of
state reserve requirements on the methods non-
member banks use for classifying uncollected funds.
Two hypotheses are tested: in states that have cash
reserve requirements and do not count CIPC as
reserves, (1) nonmemher banks report less of their
uncollected funds as CIPC than do other banks, and
(2) the percentage of banks reporting uncollected
funds as CIPC is smaller in states with higher reserve
requirements and in states which enforce reserve
requirements more rigorously.
The regression results support both of these hy-
potheses (see Appendix, section III). The percentage
of nonmember banks reporting CIPC as zero is sig-
nificantly higher in states that have cash reserve
requirements and do not count CIPC as cash reserves.
Another measure of how nonmember banks report
uncollected funds is the percentage of banks report-
ing CIPC less than 25 percent of their demand bal-
ances due from correspondents. With this second
eUneolleeted funds as a proportion of cash assets can be meas-
ured most accurately for member banks which send most
of their checks to a Federal Reserve Bank for collection. Mem-
ber banks receive credit for deposits with Reserve Banks
according to a time schedule which approximates the time
required for the FRS to make collection. Uncollected funds
which represent deposits at Federal Reserve Banks for which
member banks have not yet received credit must be reported
as GIFC. For a group of 49 member banks which regularly
deposit cheeks with their Federal Reserve Bank, CIPC was
about 83 percent of their reserve balances with their Federal
Reserve Bank. See R. Alton Gilbert, ‘Utilization of Federal
Reserve Bank Sen’iees By Member Banks: Implications for
the Costs and Benefits of Membership,” this Review (August
1977), p.3.
measure as the dependent variable, significant inde-
pendent variables are those which reflect treatment
of CIPC as cash reserves, the level of state reserve
requirements, and methods of monitoring reserve
positions of nonmember banks.
These results have implications for the level of
state reserve requirements relative to cash assets
nonmember banks would desire to hold voluntarily.
Cash reserve requirements of several states tend to
he large enough relative to voluntary holdings of
vault cash plus collected demand balances due from
correspondents to induce behavior by nonmember
banks which minimizes the burden of state reserve
requirements. Whether nonmember banks are able
to fully offset the burden of state reserve require-
ments by reporting uncollected funds as demand
balances due from correspondents cannot be deter-
mined from this analysis.
THIRD APPRO.ACH
The major cost of Federal Reserve membership is
reserves required of members, relative to reserves
held by nonmembers. If state reserve requirements
are effective, differences in requirements among states
would tend to induce differences among states in the
percentages of banks that choose Federal Reserve
membership: the percentage of banks within a state
that are members of the Federal Reserve System
would tend to be higher in states with relatively high
state reserve requirements and rigorous enforcement
by state banking authorities.
This hypothesis is also tested using regression analy-
sis.7 Results of those tests indicate that the percent-
age of banks in the Federal Resen’e is not signifi-
cantly higher in states with relatively high reserve
requirements. Thus, by just examining the levels of
state reserve requirements, such requirements do not
appear to inffnenee the membership choice of banks.
Two aspects of the enforcement of state reserve re-
quirements, however, do significantly influence the
choices of banks concerning FRS membership. The
most important variable reflects differences among
states in methods of monitoring the reserve positions
of nonmember banks, The most rigorous method state
hank supervisors nse to monitor the reserve positions
of nonrnemher banks is freqnent reports from banks
oa their reserve positions. The percentage of banks in
7
See the Appendim, section IV, for a description of the data
and statistical tests,
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the Fed is significantly higher in states which require
nonmember banks to file frequent reports on their re-
serve positions than in states which use less rigorous
methods to monitor compliance with reserve require-
ments. This resnlt is consistent with the hypothesis that
banks are more likely to choose Fed membership in
states with more rigorous enforcement of reserve
requirements.
The other significant aspect of state reserve re-
quirements is enforcement of penalties on reserve
deficiencies. Several states have dollar penalties which
are relatively low or, according to the state banking
supervisors, are seldom enforced. The percentage of
banks in the Fed is significantly lower in such states
than in other states which have higher dollar penalties,
enforce dollar penalties on reserve deficiencies more
rigorously or have various types of nondollar penalties.
These results indicate that enforcement of state re-
serve requirements, not the level of requirements,
influences the choice of banks concerning Federal
Reserve membership. One possible explanation for
this finding is that the measures of enforcement
requirements for reporting on reserve positions, the
level of dollar penalties, and degrees to which penal-
ties are imposed — reflect differences among states in
the nature of bank supervision in general, not just
enforcement of reserve requirements. Additional re-
search would be necessary to determine whether
states with relatively more rigorous enforcement of
reserve requirements also have more rigorous enforce-
ment of other banking regulations.
CONCI JcJØNS
Empirical tests presented in this paper provide con-
flicting evidence on the effectiveness of state reserve
requirements. Most nonmember banks in all but a
few states hold ratios of cash reserves to required
cash reserves which are significantly larger than
ratios of reserves to required reserves for member
banks of comparable size. These results are consistent
with the view that the cash holdings by most non-
member banks are not determined by state reserve
requirements, but by cash requirements for banking
transactions. Under this interpretation, most nonmem-
ber banks would not tend to hold less cash if their
cash reserve requirements were reduced, Thus, states
could not offset Federal Reserve System (FRS) ac-
tions intended to increase the attractiveness of mem-
bership — such as lowering member bank reserve
requirements — by lowering reserve requirements for
nonmember banks in response.
However, other evidence presented above calls for
qualifications to this general conclusion. Several rela-
tivelv large nonmember banks (total deposits of $180
million and above) keep their cash reserves as closely
tied to their required cash reserves as do member
banks of comparable size. This evidence indicates that
state reserve reqnirements are effective for some of
the relatively large nonmember banks in several
states.
Other evidence which is not necessarily consistent
with the general conclusion on effectiveness of state
reserve requirements is that on reporting of uncol-
lected funds by noninember banks. In states which
do not count cash items in the process of collection
(CIPC) as cash reserves, noumember banks report
CIPC which is a smaller percentage of their demand
balances due from correspondents than do nonmem-
her banks in other states. This evidence indicates that
nonmember banks tend to use their means of report-
ing uncollected funds to minimize the burden of state
reserve requirements.
Additional evidence which supports the conclusion
that state reserve requirements are not effective con-
cerns the influence of state reserve requirements on
the percentage of banks in various states which are
FRS members. The level of state reserve requirements
does not significantly influence the percentage of
banks which are FRS members. However, some dif-
ferences among states in methods of monitoring the
reserve positions of noumember banks and enforcing
reserve requirements are significantly related to dif-
ferences in the percentage of banks that are FRS
members.
An overall assessment of results in this analysis
supports the view that in general state reserve re-
quirements are not effective. Evidence cited above
which is inconsistent with this general conclusion
calls for only limited qualifications, and may raise
more questions than it answers.
Only a small number of nonmember banks have
total deposits over ‘$180 million. Thus, evidence on
effectiveness of state reserve requirements for several
nonmember banks in that size range applies to only a
small percentage of banks which would posssibly
be influenced by a reduction in FRS reserve
requirements.
Evidence that nonmember banks in some states
attempt to minimize the burden of state reserve re-
quirements by the way they report uncollected funds
does not indicate whether any burden remains after
banks take such actions. Nonmember banks in states
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which do not count CIPC as cash reserves may be
able to avoid all burden of state reserve require-
ments by reporting their uncollected funds as demand
balances due from correspondents.
Differences among states in methods of monitoring
reserves of nonmember banks and enforcing reserve
requirements may be related to differences among
states in overall stringency of banking regulation.
Therefore, the evidence cited above concerning vari-
ables which influence the percentages of banks which
are FRS members may indicate as much about the
influence of differences among states in overall hank
regulation as it does about the influence of state re-
serve requirements on membership choice.
Thus, evidence developed in this paper indicates
that the FRS could increase the attractiveness of
membership by lowering member bank reserve re-
quirements. With only a few exceptions, states could
not offset the effects of such an action by lowering
reserve requirements for nonmember banks.
APPENDIX
Specification of Data and Empirical Results
RATIOS OF CASH RESERVES ‘TO
IIEQUII:IE:I) f~%5’f:rRESERVES 11011
ME’rl.B.ER. ANI) t )N’Tff%fiiEf( BANKS
J/pfi,~trout 1:/re Report ut Condition
Ratios of cash reserves to required reserves are calcu-
lated for all nonmember banks in states that have cash
reserve requirements, using data ns of June 30, 1976.1 The
ratios are averaged for nonmember banks in each state
‘vithin the following size groups in terms of total deposits:
(a) up to $10 million,
(b) $10 million to $50 million,
(c) 850 million to $100 million, and
(d) $100 million to $500 million.2
Average ratios of reserves to required reserves are pre-
sented in Table A-I. Each t-statistic (calculated for the
‘See Appendix, section II, for discussion of a possible bias in
the Report of Condition data.
~In nost states there are few, if army, nonmember banks with
total deposits over $500 million, The influence of bank size
on the ratios of reserves to required reserves is held constant
by dividing nonmernber banks in each state into these size
groups. A few banks which had extreme ratios were elimi-
nated from the analysis. The banks which were eliminated
frons calculations in this section were also eliminated from
analysis in the following sections. Another study has drawn
inferences about the effectiveness of state reserve require-
ments based npon reserve ratios from the Rcport of Corrdi-
tion. One limitation of the study is that no criterion was de-
veloped from detennining how large reserves can be in
difference between the mean ratio for nonmember banks
and the mean ratio for members of comparable size) is
used to test the hpothesis that reserve requirements of a
state are effeetive.~In each ease in ‘which the difference
in mean ratios is not significantly different from zero, re-
serve requirements of that state are considered as signifi-
cant in determining the cash holdings of nonmember
banks as FRS reserve requirements are in determining the
reserves of member banks.
Results in Table A-I indicate that nonmember banks in
most states hold cash reserves which are substantinlly
above their required cash reserves, Nonmember banks in
all but two states, South Dakota and Wisconsin, had aver-
age ratios of reserves to required reserves which were
significantly higher than the average reserve ratios for
member banks of comparable size. Reserve requirements
are relatively high in both of these states. Thus, based
upon the criterion used in this section, state reserve re-
quirements are as effective as FRS reserve requirements
in only two of the 38 states examined.
relation to required reserves as of an individual day and yet
lie consistent with effective state reserve requirements. See
Perry D. Quick, Appendix A, “Nonmember Bank Reserve
Requirements,” in The Burden of Federal Reserve Member-
ship, NOW Accounts, and the Payment of Interest on Re-
serves,” prepared by the Staff of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve Systens, June 1977, pp. 71-96.
3
Meamr ratios of reserves to required reserves, based upon the
Report of Condition for Jusse 30, 1976, are calculated for the
combined group of member banks in those states which have
cash reserve requirements. This group of states includes most
member banks in the nation.
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Iia.tios J:r lioranember Weekly
Reporting Banks
Weekly reporting banks comprise a national sample of
relatively large commercial banks which report balance
sheet information as of each Wednesday. In 1976, 23
weekly reporting banks were nonmembers, each with total
deposits over $180 million. Two of those banks are located
in states with no cash reserve requirements. Ratios of
cash reserves to required cash reserves were calculated for
the remaining 21 banks as of each Wednesday in 1976
and averaged for each bank over the year (see Table A-IT).
As a basis for comparison, average ratios of reserves
to required reserves, under reserve requirements of the
Federal Reserve, were calculated for 18 member banks
in the Eighth District, with total deposits of at least $180
million. For comparability with data for nonmembers, the
measure of cash reserves for each member bank is its re-
serve balance at the Federal Reserve at the close of each
Wednesday plus average daily vault cash during the
reserve settlement week ending two weeks earlier. Aver-
age daily required reserves are based upon deposit liabil-
ities two weeks earlier. Ratios of reserves to required
reserves are calculated for each member bank for each
Wednesday in the period from September 15, 1976
through January 12, 1977.
Mean ratios of reserves to required reserves of the 18
member banks are used to establish an acceptance region
for testing the hypothesis that the mean reserve ratio for
each nonmember bank was drawn from the same distri-
bution as that for member banks. This hypothesis is not
rejected, at the 5 percent level of significance, if the
mean ratio for a nonmember is in the range from 0.585
to 1.509.
Using this criterion, the hypothesis that reserve require-
ments are effective is not rejected for 12 of the 21 non-
member banks, located in California, Hawaii, Michigan,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Thus,
results in Table A-IT provide evidence of effective reserve
requirements in several states for some of the relatively
large nonmember banks.
tppu:~ysisou P0551111K: BIAS
IN RPKORT 015 CONDITU.I)N
One possible problem with relying upon the Report of
Condition for information on cash holdings of nonmember
banks is that banks might increase their cash holdings on
the known dates for the Report of Condition and reduce
them immediately afterwards. Banks might behave that
way if they generally hold cash reserves which are less
than required reserves, since that report is disclosed to the
public and made available to state banking authorities.
Determining whether cash holdings of nonmember
banks from the Report of Condition are unusually high
requires information from other sources for comparison.
One source is the data for nonmember weekly reporting
banks discussed above.
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Although weekly reporting banks are larger than most
nonmembers used in the calculations from the Report of
Condition, they are probably part of the noninember
group which would have the greatest incentives to hold
unusually high cash reserves on the Report of Condition
dates. Nonmember banks in the smaller size groups in
most states report cash reserves which are substantially
above required cash reserves, These banks would not have
incentives to hold cash reserves that much larger than
their required cash reserves for just the day of the report.
In contrast, the larger nonmemher banks in most states
tend to have lower ratios of cash reserves to required
cash reserves than the small banks. Therefore, if any
nonmember banks increase their cash reserves on Report
of Condition dates to appear to be meeting reserve re-
quirements, the relatively large noninember banks would
be most likely to do so.
One Wednesday in 1976 occurred on June 30, which
is a Report of Condition date. For each of the 21 non-
member weekly reporting banks in states with cash re-
serve requirements, cash reserves reported as of June 30
are conspared to the average of their cash reserves as of
the four previous Wednesdays and the following four
Wednesdays.
Eight of the 21 banks had higher cash reserves on
June 30 than the average of both the previous and fol-
Table AU
RATIO OF RESERVES TO REQUIRED RESERVES:




Average Ratio of Effecti’u’e
Bank for Each State Reserve
Stote Number Wednesday, 1976 Requirementc




Connecticut 1 1.810 Reject
2 2.329 Reject
3 2.241 Reject
Delaworo 1 5.625 Reject
Kowoii 1 0986 Accept
2 0.839 Accept
Maryland I 1.846 Reject
Michigan 1 1.353 Accept
Missouri I 2.004 Reject
New York 1 2.029 Reject
2 1 112 Accept
North Carolina 1 1.800 Reject
2 1.445 Accept
Ohio 1 1.300 Accept
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Table A.lll
IDENTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND SPECIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES
- Direction of Influence on Dependent Variables:
Percentage of Banks Reporting OPC
(01 equal to zero, (b) es, than
10 percent of due from bolancLs. Percentage of Banks
or (c) less than 25 percent of in the Federal
Symbol Description at Variable due from _b,alances Reserve System
MPC 0 Percentage of member banks reporting CIPC equal -l
to zero.
MPC 10 Percentage of member banks reporting CIPC less than 4’
10 percent of their demand balances due from cor-
respondent banks.
MPC 25 Percentage of member banks reporting C5PC less than +
25 percent at their demand balances due from cor-
respondent banks.
EFF Dummy variable w:th value of unity if a state has -I-
cash reserve requirements and CIPC are not counted
as reserves.
RR Measure of state cash reserve requirements. Far each
nanmember bank in a graup. cash reserves required
by the state are subtracted from reserves that would
be required as a Federal Reserve member, and the
d,fference is divided by fatal deposits. These ratios are
averaged for nonmember banks in each group.
WEEKLY Value of unity if the reserve settlement period is + +
weakly, zero otherwise.
BIWEEKLY Value of unity if the reserve settlement period is 2
biweekly or semimonthly, zero otherwise.
REPORT Value of unity if nanmember banks must file frequent ++
reports with the slate banking authorities an deposit
liabilities and reserve positions, zero otherwise.
REC EXAM Value of unity if nanmember banks do nof have to 22
report on reserve pas’tians regularly, but must keep
recards on reserve pasitians to be inspected by state
examiners during regular examinations, zero otherwise.
REP DEF Value of unity if nonmember banks must reparf re- t -I
serve deficiencies to state banking authanities within
a short period of time after deficiencies occur, zero
otherwise.
LO PEN Value of unity if there are small dollar penalties on 22
reserve deficiencies or if dollar penalties are infre-
quently enforced, zero otherwise.
1
HI PEN Value of unity if there are relatively large dollar 4” +
penalties for reserve deficiencies which ore enfarced
with relative frequency, zero atherwise.
2
NE Dummy variable with value of unity if a state has
no cash reserve roqeire-ments, zero otherwise.
Ratio ISO Dummy variable with value of unity if the average +
ratio of cash roeerves to required cash reserves far
a group of nonmember banks is less than 1.5. zero
at herwise.
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hold excess cash reserves. Thus, data for norsmember
weekly reporting banks provide little evidence that they
hold unusuallyhigh reserves on Report of Condition dates.
EFFECTS OF STATE RESERVE




Banks in each state are divided into the size groups
used in Table A-I. The following measures are used sepa-
rately as dependent variables,
(a) percentage of nonmember banks which report
CIPC that is equal to zero on their June 30, 1976
Report of Condition,
(b) percentage of nonmembers which report CIPC
that is less than ten percent of their demand bal-
ances due from correspondents, and
(c) percentage of nonmember banks which report
CIPC that is less than 25 percent of their demand
balances due from correspondents.
Independent variables are described below, Their hy-
pothesized influences are summarized in Table A-Ill.
Infloonne of Bank Size —~Means 0f classifying uncol-
lected funds appear to be related to bank size, the per-
centages specified above tending to be higher for smaller
banks. Influences of bank size are estimated by using
dummy variables (seeTable A-Ill for specification of those
variables).
CIa iflent.ion of Un-.colla ted F’unrC I)y Sternher Be.nkr
— Ratios of CIPC to demand balances due from corre-
spondents for member banks may be systematically related
to the same ratio for nonmember banks of similar size in
the same state. Independent variables reflecting the prac-
tices by member banks of reporting uncollected funds are
constructed in the same way as the dependent variables
specified above,
Geographic and transportation factors may influence
the speed with which checks are collected by both mem-
ber and nonmember banks in different states. Including
independent variables based upon the ratios for member
banks of CIPC to balances due from correspondents
would account for these common influences on uncollected
funds.
Another reason for including these measures for mem-
ber banks is the variation among correspondent banks in
methods of accounting for uncollected funds. Most of the
observations in this paper are for banks with total deposits
of less than $50 million, Many member banks in that size
range clear checks through correspondents instead of
through the FRS,4 For these member banks, the practice
of classifying uncollected funds as CIPC or balances due
4
R. Alton Gilbert, “Utilization of Federal Reserve Bank Services
By Member Banks Implications for the Costs and Benefits of
Membership,” this Review (August 1977), pp. 2-15.
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from correspondents will be influenced by the accounting
practices of the correspondent banks through which they
and nonmember banks clear checks. Member banks have
no incentive to classify uncollected funds as due from
balances, since both CIFC and demand balances due from
correspondents are subtracted from gross demand deposits
to detennine demand deposits subject to member bank
reserve requirements.
Use of these measures for memberbanks as independent
variables could bias the results. Correspondents might
adjust their methods of accounting for uncollected funds
to accommodate the desire of nonmembers to use un-
collected funds to meet state reserve requirements. Meth-
ods of accounting for uncollected funds by member banks
would reflect, to some extent, the accommodation of cor-
respondents to nonmember bank wishes. In this case, in-
clusion of variables for classification of uncollected funds
by member banks in the regression analysis would bias
downward the estimated influence of state reserve require-
ments on the classification of uncollected funds by non-
members. To allow for such bias, variables for member
banks are removed in some regression equations.
Ckrsnificatien of CISC in Ste.te Reserve Reqnlrernent.s
— A dummy variable is specified to reflect the incentives
of nonmember banks to classify uncollected funds as de-
mand balances due from correspondents: EFF has a value
of unity for states that have cash reserve requirements and
do not count CIPC as reserves, and has a value of zero
otherwise.5
Mees-uren-,ent of Butte Reserve Rronlrerne.nts — Levels
of state reserve requirements are difficult to compare.
Some apply to demand deposits only; others apply to all
deposits grouped together. Most states have different re-
serve requirements for demand and time deposits. Reserve
requirements are fiat percentages in some states and grad-
uated in others. Thus, comparison of reserve requirements
among states depends upon the size of banks for which
comparisons are made and the composition of their de-
posit liabilities,
If a state allows nonmember banks to meet all of their
reserve requirements with interest-earning assets, that
state is considered to have no cash reserve requirements.
Levels of reserve requirements are not calculated for those
states. For each nonmember bank in other states, the
relative level of state cash reserve requirements is meas-
ured by calculating cash reserves that would be required
as a Federal Reserve member, subtracting cash reserves
required as a nonmember, and dividing the difference by
total deposits. This ratio, denoted as RR, is averaged for
banks in each size group in the various states.
tenuosine end lf’erv in5 Si-ate B.r.’se’rve Reqoisentents
There is substantial variation among states in proce-
dures for monitoring the reserve positions of noninember
banks and for enforcing state reserve requirements.
Dummy variables are used to reflect differences in reserve
settlement periods, in methods of monitoring reserve posi-
5Values for the levels of state cash reserve requirements and
the indicators of monitoring and enforcement discussed below
are set equal to zero for states that count CIPC as reserves
and for those states with no cash reserve requirements.~11
P1
Table A-tv
EFFECTS OF STATE RESERVE REQUIREMENTS ON THE REPORTING OF UNCOllECTED FUNDS BY NONMEMBER BANKS
r
INDEPENDENT VARtABLES
Ct-statistics in parentheses under regression coefficients) P1
Degrees P1
Equation EFF’RR EFFRR EFFRR — Standard of






(Depcndent variable; percent of nonmember banks reporting CIPC as zero~
1 38.65 8.64 --0.99 19.45 0.495 15.582 77
(5.094) (1.169) ( 0.113) (2.791) a
2 847 -3.19 —3.10 0.87 15.92 0.775 10.404 76
(1.429) (--0.628) (- 0.533) (9.834) (3.412)
3 8.80 —3.17 -3.22 0.85 4.01 14.41 0.781 10.270 75 r
(1.504) ( 0.633) ( 0.561) (9.583) (1.734) (3.074) g
4 791 —3.67 356 0.85 4.75 —1.21 14.86 0.780 10.284 74
(1.331) ( 0.727) ( 0.619) (9.610) (1.929) (—0.890) (3.1 47)
5 37.77 8.09 1.31 7.39 16.49 0.519 15.216 76
(5091) (1.120) ( 0.155) (2180) (2.377)
6 3t65 8.Oi 1.371 7.52 —0.21 16.57 0.513 15.315 75
(4.984) (1.097) (-0.160) (2.067) (—0.104) (2.358)
7 34 35 8.276 3./18 7.02 16.66 0.507 14.829 93
(5.2/2) (1.219) (- 0.501) (2.343) (2.671)
(Dependent variable- percent at nonmembc-r banks reporting CIPC as iess than 25% of demand balances at correspondents)
8 13.34 8.14 —7 74 80.50 0.246 8.542 77
(3.207) (2.010) ( 0.575) (21.073)
9 5.73 2.50 458 0.15 75.62 0.296 8.254 76
(l.14J1 (0579) ( 0.983) (2.545) (18.176)
10 5.90 2.69 - 4.50 0.16 —2.44 76.52 0.303 8.212 75
(1.1 84) (0.603) ( 0.9/1) (2.597) ( 1.334) (18.246)
11 1361 8.32 2.64 —2.30 81.42 0.251 8.516 76
(3777) (2.057) ( ‘L555~ (—1.211) (20.9661
12 11.45 8.22 -2.72 —2.17 -0.29 81.53 0.241 8.569 75
(3.181) (2.011) (--0.567) ( 1.041) (—0.254) (20.738)
13 14.20 8.51 -0.09 7.50 —8.02 —2.12 80.69 0.361 7.865 74
~3671) (2.276) ( 0020) (3.720J (—35591 ~—l.409l (22 659)
14 11.08 1.24 —4.34 81.37 0.225 8903 94
(2.833) (1.864) ( 09/4) (22.388)
15 11.29 7.45 —2.38 6.01 —7.97 —1.91 81.95 0.304 8.436 91
(3.013) (2016) ( 0.559) (2.994) (—3.495) (—1.184) (23.604)
aOh~.~ atioris in rn si. 5 ‘nd. ir &a.e ~.ith 10 or mnie nonmnnbera and 10 or more member:, except equations 7. 14. and 35, whir); are fcir m.jpa with 10 ir more nonmember. —.
(5 with iso m;iinn.in, —ii;snber i n_i sn_ic
tO
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tions of noninember banks, and in penalties for reserve
deficiencies.
interaction Tenns Variation in the level of state re-
serve requirements may have a stronger effect on the
classification of uncollected funds by nonmember banks
in those states with more strict monitoring and enforce-
ment of state reserve requirements. Interaction tenns for
the level of reserve requirements and dummy variables
for enforcement are included as independent variables to
test this hypothesis.
Esnpi’nic’al tiesolts
In the first seven equations in Table A-Tv, the depend-
ent variable is the percentage of noninember banks re-
porting CIPC equal to zero. The percentage of member
banks reporting CIPC as zero is positively related to that
percentage for nonmember banks [equations (2) — (4)].
Thus, the accounting practices of member and nonmem-
her banks appear to reflect the common influences dis-
cussed above.
The one aspect of state reserve requirements which
influences the percentage of nonmember banks that report
CIPC as zero is the variable for states that have cash
reserve requirements and do not count CIPC as reserves
(EFF), having a positive influence as hypothesized
[equations (5) — (7)]. Among states with cash reserve
requirements which do not count CIPC as reserves, the
level of reserve requirements (RB) does not add signifi-
cantly to the explanation of the dependent variable
[equation (6)].
However, when the percentage of member banks re-
porting CIPC as zero is included as an independent var-
iable, the variable that reflects the status of CTPC in state
reserve requirements (EFF) is not significant [equations
(3) and (4)]. This result is consistent with the view that
both member and nonmember banks base their methods
of accounting for uncollected funds upon the accounting
methods of correspondent banks, and that correspondent
banks adjust their accounting methods to serve the
interests of nonmember banks in meeting reserve
requirements.
Equations (8) — (15) of Table A-Iv present regression
results with another dependent variable — the percentage
of nonmemebr banks reporting CIPC which is less than
25 percent of their demand balances due from correspond-
ents.°Several measures of state reserve requirements are
significant, if the variable reflecting the reporting of un-
collected funds by member banks is eliminated from re-
gressions. The combination of measures of reserve require-
ments which yields the lowest standard error [reported in
equation (13)1 includes levels of state reserve require-
ments (RR), dummy variables reflecting differences
among states in treatment of CIPC as reserves (EFF),
and methods of monitoring reserve positions of nomnem-
her banks (REC EXAM, REP DEF, and WEEKLY).7
OEffects of state reserve requirements were insignificant with
the percentage of banks reporting CIPC which is less than ten
percent of due from balances as thc dependent variable.
~Value of the F-statistic for testing the combined influence of
these three variables, compared to the explanation due to bank
size variables alone, is 5.61. With 3 degrees of freedom in the
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EFFECTS OF- STATE RESERVE
REQUIREMENTS ON Ci’-IOICE OF
MEMBERSI--IIP STATUS BY BANKS
S-pacification of Variables
Percentage of banks that are members (as of June
1976) is the dependent variable. Membership status is
strongly related to bank size; most very small banks are
nonmembers and most large banks are members (see
Table A-v). Effects of bank size are held constant by
calculating the percentage of banks that are members in
individual size groups in the various states, using the
same size categories as in the previous sections.8 Inde-
pendent variables and hypotheses concerning the direction
of influence of these variables on the percentage of banks
that are Federal Reserve members are presented in
Table A-Ill.
Unt--ptri-cal Results
Regression results are presented in Table A-VT. One test
involves two measures of reserve requirement levels as
Tobk A-V
PERCENT OF INSURED COMMERCIAL BANKS
IN EACH SIZE GROUP THAT WERE MEMBERS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1976
Asset Size
(in m,Ilions) Percent
$ S or less 18.7°/a






500 or mOre 86.7
.‘s,irr.:I,,l,.—,tl I Its.—.,.it ‘‘.~rjc’t
numerator and 74 ia the denominator, the F-statistic is sig-
nificant at the 0.5 percent level. Equations (8) and (13) were
reestimated with the expanded sample used in equation (7).
The combination of variables reflecting state reserve require-
ments in equation (15) is significant at the 5 percent level
(F-statistic of 4,564 with degrees of freedom of 3 and 91).
5The iniluence of state reserve requirements on choice of mem-
bership status by banks has been tested in other studies. See
Chris Joseph Prestopino, “Do Higher Reserve Requirements
Discourage Federal Reserve Membership?,” Journal of Finance
(December 1976), pp. 1471-80; John T. Rose, “Do Higher
Reserve Requirements Discourage Federal Reserve Member-
ship?: Comment,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, mineo, June 1977. However, a major problem with
those studies is that percentages of banks in the Federal Re-
serve System are calculated for entire states. They include
measures to reflect the size distributions of banks in individual
states, The approach in this study probably deals with that
effect more directly. Another advantage of the approach in
this paper is that it increases the number of degrees of free-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5variable for periodic reporting of reserve positions to
state banking authorities (REPORT) as an independent
variable, the requirement of reporting reserve deficiencies
(REP DEF) does not significantly influence the member-
ship choice of banks.
Another variable which does significantly influence the
percentage of banks in the Federal Reserve is a dummy
variable for states which indicated that their dollar pen-
10
1n regressions not reported in Table A-VI, the dummy variable
for states with more strict enforcement of dollar penalties for
reserve deficiencies (i-I! PEN) was substituted for LO PEN,
other variables the same as in equation (8). The regression
coefficient of Hi PEN was not significantly different from
allies for reserve deficiencies are relatively low or seldom
imposed (LO PEN). The regression coefficient for this
variable is negative [equation (8)1, indicating that the per-
centage of members is relatively low in such states.10
zero. Additional tests were conducted to determine whether
differences in levels of reserve requirements among states
have significant influences on the percentage of banks that
are members if significant features of state policies on moni-
toring and enforcement are held constant. Those tests involved
adding independent variables derived by multiplying the
measure for levels of reserve requirements (RR) by each of
the significant dummy variables for enforcement (REPORT,
LO PEN). In those equations (not reported in Table A-VU
the regression coefficient for those additional independent
variables were insignificant.
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